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“God has many gifts which He lavishes upon his creatures: among them
is the gift of scholarship . . .”1 and “[t]o every gift [including the gift of
scholarship] attaches an obligation.”2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal scholars have filled books, treatises, magazines, journals and law
reviews with various writings ranging from highly intricate and complex theses
to oversimplified and homogenous explanations. In all its forms, legal
scholarship has been both touted and taunted by external and internal critics
throughout the years.3 Some suggest that legal scholarship should holistically
* Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Florida Agricultural & Mechanical
University (“FAMU”), College of Law; J.D.: Florida State University College of Law, Cum Laude
1994; B.S.: University of Florida, 1991.
1. David Lefkowitz, The Obligations of Scholarship, 5 PHI BETA KAPPA KEY 502, 503 (1924).
2. Id. at 502.
3. See, e.g., Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions of the
U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701, 717 (2012) (tracing the contours of the
conflict over the construction of the role(s), or persona(e), of the U.S. law professor, Professor Pedrioli
summarizes some of the conflicting views regarding the purpose of legal scholarship); see also Lee
Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 191, 192 (2002) (contrasting the purposes of legal
scholarship, as articulated by Goldsmith, Vermeule, and others, with that of empirical research, which
aims to “learn about the world” (quoting Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 9 n.23 (2002))); Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 6, 8 (2016) (summarizing the criticisms from both inside legal academia and the outside
bar as follows: “[A]ccording to one of these various camps of either internal or external critics, much
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“frame recommendations to responsible decision makers,” and more
specifically “help the reader understand law.”4 Others suggest that it should be
used to bring “restraint, proportion, perspective and atmosphere” into the legal
landscape and society at large.5 Whatever its stated purpose and whether it be
doctrinal, descriptive or practical, legal scholarship remains an intricate and
influential factor in legal academia, the legal system as a whole, and shaping
cultural and professional discourses. As such, the varied and broad topics of
of what we call ‘legal scholarship’ may be scholarship but it’s not ‘law’—it is too academic, too
disciplined, too theoretic, and too detached, of no use to the profession and therefore of no value; or,
according to another camp, much of what we call legal scholarship may be ‘legal’ but it’s not true
scholarship—it’s nothing but legal writing in disguise, elaborated memoranda for courts, legislators,
or regulators, but it’s not scholarship. Legal scholarship, in short, is on the horns of a ‘normativity’
dilemma. To some critics, legal scholarship isn’t scholarship, because it’s too normative, while to
another camp, it may be scholarship, but it isn’t legal because it’s not normative enough. For every
critique, both inside and outside the academy, one can find its opposite, also forcefully voiced. Legal
scholarship does not want for critics.”). Much of the dispute about legal scholarship stems from
disputes regarding the purpose of such scholarship. For example, disputes as to whether legal scholars
write for each other or for legal decisionmakers outside academia? Whether doctrinal analysis is the
core of legal scholarship versus whether such scholarship is “too pedestrian and practice-oriented”?
Whether scholars should engage in “internal” critiques of legal rules, or “external” critiques of legal
practice (including the practice of scholarship)? Whether legal scholarship should be prescriptive, or
mainly descriptive? This Article will not debate the intricacies of legal scholarship’s purpose per se;
it posits that despite the objective of legal scholarship, whether it be prescriptive or descriptive,
analytical or practical; the overarching purpose must include a satisfaction of the social contract
between the public and the legal profession. For more in-depth reviews of the purpose of legal
scholarship, see David Monsma, The Academic Equivalence of Science and Law: Normative Legal
Scholarship in the Quantitative Domain of Social Science, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 157 (2006); Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 807, 840–42 (1993); Robert Weisberg, A Symposium On Legal Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 521, 521 (1992); Papers from the Yale Journal Symposium on Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and
Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981); David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be
Fewer Articles Like This One: Law Professors Should Write More For Legal Decision-Makers And
Less For Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 761, 763 (2005) (joining the debate on the role of legal
scholarship); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 889, 889 (1992) (suggesting that much of the dispute stems from our lack of any theory of
evaluation); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 75 (1992) (“[T]he growing disarray we now see in the profession is
directly related to the growing incoherence in law teaching and scholarship.”); Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2191, 2219 (1993); see also Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1436–37 (1996) (discussing
why legal scholarship is mainly prescriptive in suggesting that a new synthesis of discourse for legal
scholarship can be developed by incorporating law, social policy, and social change).
4. Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 792, 796 (1991); Farber & Sherry, supra note 3, at 809.
5. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 504.
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legal scholarship (the empirical, the interpretive, the normative, and the
prescriptive) provide innumerable opportunities for legal scholars:
opportunities that are truly a “gift” as noted by Professor Lefkowitz.6 This
“gift” should not be taken for granted, and “should comport with [both] the
goals and attributes of the academy”7 and with the goals and conditions of the
legal profession.
However, a 2015 empirical study concluded that legal scholarship, “in its
present form, is a massive and unsupportable investment in what benefits a few
people in a narrow universe.”8 In fact, research indicates that current legal
scholarship’s benefit to any groups outside of law professors is “attenuated at
best.”9 To passively acknowledge this as fact without a conscious effort to
change the reputation of legal scholarship should be unacceptable to legal
scholars. As members of the community of higher education, legal scholars
must fulfil their basic responsibility of refining, extending, and transmitting
knowledge.10 This responsibility extends beyond the ears of law students and
the doors of law schools. Legal scholars have an obligation not just to
academia, but to law schools, the greater legal community, and society in
general to increase the reach and impact of legal scholarship. This obligation,
owed to society as a whole,11 requires legitimacy that entails a few basic
responsibilities such as sincerity, candor, exhaustiveness, and thoroughness.
This Article will explore the basic tenets of these responsibilities in an effort to
articulate the legal scholar’s obligations owed under a “social contract” with
society. Part II will briefly discuss the scholar’s social contract with society
which serves as a foundation for the accountability of legal scholarship. Part
III will explore the scholar’s obligations of sincerity and candor. Part IV will
discuss the obligation and importance of exhaustiveness and thoroughness. Part
6. Id. at 503.
7. Farber & Sherry, supra note 3, at 809. In providing an overview of the legal storytelling
movement and evaluating its claims, the authors discuss the fundamental purposes of legal scholarship
and how storytelling can contribute to the same. Id. at 811.
8. Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications and the Troubled State of
Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 50 (2015) (identifying fundamental
problems with legal scholarship such as use of citations).
9. Id. at 58 (indicating that empirical studies evidence that “[t]he benefits of legal scholarship to
any constituent group (other than law professors) are, as [the authors’] study demonstrates, attenuated
at best”).
10. AALS, STATEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICES BY LAW PROFESSORS IN THE DISCHARGE OF
THEIR
ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(amended
2017)
(1989),
https://www.aals.org/members/other-member-services/aals-statements/ethics/ [https://perma.cc/8J7SBMW9] [hereinafter AALS STATEMENT].
11. See infra Part II (regarding the social contract).
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V will offer suggested criteria for legal scholars’ fulfillment of these critical
obligations.
II. LEGAL SCHOLARS’ SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH SOCIETY
In 2014, the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education reported
that “[s]ociety has a deep interest in the competence of lawyers, in their
availability to serve society and clients, in the broad public role they can play,
and in their professional values.”12 This societal concern and investment is a
crucial factor in the relationship between law and society. As lawyers, legal
scholars are an intricate part of the profession whether or not they realize “that
they are engaged in a common enterprise—the education and professional
development of the members of a great profession” or view themselves “as
[being] separated [from practicing lawyers] by a ‘gap.’”13 Beyond the duties of
teaching students, furthering scholarly pursuits, and ensuring the substantive
competence of tomorrow’s lawyers, law professors have a broader obligation
in this “common enterprise”14 to ensure that scholarly contributions “uphold
and enhance” the professional values and “standards of the legal profession.”15
As with all lawyers, these contributions are instrumental in the “effective
functioning of ordered society” and their interplay in society creates what has
been posited as a “social contract” between lawyers and the general public.16
The basis for this social contract is the autonomy granted by the public to the
legal profession wherein the legal profession should foster the core ideals and
values of the profession and regulate itself via peer review, standards for entry
into and continued membership in the profession, and standards for “how
individual professionals perform their work so that it serves the public good in

12. ABA TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6
(2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_
recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ7D-KRN5] [hereinafter
ABA TASK FORCE, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS].
13. See ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT–
AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 3 (ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar ed., 1992),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_educati
on_and_professional_development_maccrate_report%29.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ7NQKRC]. This report is otherwise known as the “MacCrate Report.”
14. Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The “New Normal” for Educating Lawyers, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 53,
71–72 (2016) (“[L]aw professors have a broader obligation in this ‘common enterprise’ to ensure that
the attributes and qualities displayed by new lawyers will serve to uphold and enhance the standards
of the legal profession.”).
15. Id. at 72.
16. ABA TASK FORCE, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 12, at 6.
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the area of the profession’s responsibility.”17 In return, the profession has duties
to the public to
maintain high standards of minimum competence and ethical
conduct to serve the public purpose of the profession and to
discipline those who fail to meet these standards; to promote
the core values and ideals of the profession; and to restrain selfinterest to some degree to serve the public purpose of the
profession.18
This social contract produces moral responsibilities that should be upheld by
every legal professional, including legal scholars.19
Paragraphs 10–12 of the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct emphasize the importance of the legal profession fulfilling its
obligation under this social contract, with Paragraph 12 stating that “[t]he legal
profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of selfgovernment . . . . Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the
independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.”20
Society trusts that the contract will be honored and it is this public reliance that
is key to the tenets of the social contract. Doubt or distrust in the legal
profession’s ability to uphold its responsibilities could result in potential
revision of the social contract and threaten a reduction (or elimination) of the
profession’s autonomy. It is therefore imperative that the legal profession,
including legal scholars, fulfill their correlative duties to ensure that the social
contract is being satisfied. These duties necessarily require sincerity, candor,
and thoroughness in production of legal scholarship.

17. Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2008, at 4, 4–5.
18. Id. at 5 (citing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE
OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 21 (Jossey-Bass ed., 2nd ed. 2005)).
19. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 24–25 (Donald A. Cress
trans., 1987) (1762) (“[The social contract] produces a moral and collective body . . . which receives
from this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will.”); see also Hillary A. Sale, Educating
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law, 49 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 71, 71 (2008) (book review)
(noting that lawyers operate under this social contract both “in the public sphere and with the public
trust”).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE paras. 10–12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007)
(emphasis added).
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III. OBLIGATIONS OF SINCERITY AND CANDOR
“You can’t have a high standard of scholarship without having a high
standard of integrity, because the essence of scholarship is truth.”21
The “desire to find or to say what is true” is commonly acknowledged as
one purpose of legal scholarship.22 Implicit in this is the goal to create a
community of academic inquiry that is solidly based on truth.23 In order to
serve the profession’s public purpose under the social contract, legal scholars
must therefore have a commitment to truth. This requires open-mindedness,
“intellectual honesty,”24 and exercising some “meaningful restraint on self
interest.”25 Certainly scholars should be aware of their audience, and purpose
(be it to inform or persuade).26 Even if scholars’ writings are a result of the
process of thinking things through with a goal of providing arguments,
suggestions or recommendations; or to publicly “test out and develop one or
another intellectual project,”27 the scholar must be honest in presenting
evidence. The scholar should also be open to “revealing the extent to which he
has [or has not] conformed to the methodological conventions of the
discipline.”28 To do otherwise creates a cloud of manipulation and can reek of
deception or some hidden motive or agenda. This cloud could undermine the
integrity of our legal system and the laws it interprets and creates.
Although judges and other legal scholars have criticized legal scholarship’s
relevance to the judiciary,29 empirical studies evidence that, in fact, the use of

21. About
Us,
JOHN
HOPE
FRANKLIN
CTR.,
https://jhfc.duke.edu/about/
[https://perma.cc/N6WP-FZDF] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (quoting Dr. John Hope Franklin).
22. Nancy L. Cook, Outside the Tradition: Literature as Legal Scholarship, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
95, 124 (1994); see also Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal
Scholarship, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 185, 186 (1994) (“The purpose of legal scholarship is the
achievement of truth.”).
23. Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1986) (noting that
the scholar “must be honest in presenting evidence”).
24. AALS STATEMENT, supra note 10, § II (“The scholar’s commitment to truth requires
intellectual honesty and open-mindedness.”).
25. Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the Formation of an
Ethical Professional Identity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 470, 494 (2008).
26. Carol Sanger, Editing, 82 GEO. L.J. 513, 515 (1993) (“Law professors write in law reviews
in order to inform or persuade a particular public—the bar, legislatures, courts, colleagues—on some
point of legal doctrine or theory each author thinks is important.”).
27. Id.
28. Cramton, supra note 23, at 5.
29. See, e.g., Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 3, at 778 (claiming that the “trend” toward “‘not
merely unhelpful,’ but ‘useless’” legal scholarship is “already apparent”).
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legal scholarship by the federal circuit courts of appeals has increased.30 It is
therefore imperative that scholarship that impacts the law be accurate and
honest. Furthermore, the social contract dictates upholding the values of the
profession including the maintenance of the integrity of the profession.31 This
necessitates avoidance of any “professional misconduct” such as “dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”32 As an old wise woman once told me, “If
you are not speaking truth, you are telling a lie or a half-truth: both of which
are dishonest and insincere.” The truth hurts sometimes. However, truth given
without any malice or negative intent will be received and appreciated. Legal
scholarship must therefore be committed to telling “the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth.”
IV. OBLIGATIONS OF EXHAUSTIVENESS AND THOROUGHNESS
Implicit in the truthfulness and sincerity of legal scholarship are the
correlative obligations of exhaustiveness and thoroughness. In general, legal
scholarship can involve the process of explaining, expounding or even rejecting
ideologies of the legal and economic systems; developing/creating something
new; or reclaiming the old with modifications that provide improvement.
Critical analysis is crucial regardless of the form or purpose of the scholarship.
The importance of critical analysis is illustrated through certain aspects of legal
scholarship that directly impact society such as scholarship on difficult social
issues. Scholars necessarily often have to confront difficult issues such as
inequality and divisions in race, gender, environmental, and economic
systems.33 The present political and social climate highlight divisions,
inequalities, and deep rifts in the foundation of our society.34 Laws and policies
that either support or repair these rifts are often fodder for scholarly debate.
The contemporary moment with potential dangers of oligarchy and
authoritarianism highlights the need for critical and analytical scholarship. In
order to accomplish this and fulfill the legal scholar’s obligation under the
social contract necessarily requires exhaustive research and analysis. There
must therefore be a commitment to critical legal analysis which includes
thorough review and engagement with the work of other scholars. This does
30. David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts
of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2011) (citing results from an
empirical study that evidence an increase in the use of legal scholarship citations in federal court of
appeals decisions).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“Misconduct”).
32. Id. at r. 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”).
33. See West, supra note 3, at 10.
34. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 14, at 55.
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not simply envision an exercise in intellectual oeuvre. Rather, it is an integral
component of the legal scholar’s responsibility under the social contract.
Exhaustive and thorough research must necessarily include both the
individual scholar’s perspective of the subject matter and a collective discourse
on the topic. To flesh out the sincerity of an issue requires critical review of
the body of knowledge and information on that issue. The lack of bluntlycriticized scholarship indicates a hesitancy to cause potential denigration or
disparagement of other scholars’ work. However, that hesitancy undermines
the scholarly enterprise by failing to adhere to the tenets of truth, sincerity, and
candor. Conversely, legal scholarship can strengthen the scholarly enterprise
by fairly presenting both sides of an argument to highlight the pros and cons of
perspectives thereby strengthening the truth of the writings.
Authors rely on their expertise and experience to fuel the creative process
of legal scholarship. The ideas that result from this process create laws and
legal norms. It has been argued with some sincerity that “there are no original
ideas.”35 “On the other hand, it may be argued that all ideas are original to a
given individual, regardless of how many times the idea has been proposed by
others.”36 Either way, to have true scholarly value, the ideas (original or not)
should contribute to the “building blocks” that construct the law.37 The social
contract demands legal scholars’ contribution to these building blocks, and an
expectancy that there will be some analysis, evaluation, and assessment of
same. A necessary component of authorship is inevitable exposure to criticism
or analysis of one’s work. The legal profession prides itself on breeding civility
and professionalism. If civility is the norm, any criticism of other scholarship
will not be perceived as an attack or negative censure. In fact, judgment on the
merits and faults of scholarship encourage engagement with other scholars.
Law professors often instruct students who are writing scholarly articles to
figure out how they can “join” and “contribute” to the scholarly conversation
on the topic they are researching. The intellectual discourse is just that: a form
of conversation. To be the only person talking in a room full of intellectual
resources would minimize the scholarly voice into a narcissistic monologue that
fails to provide any meaningful contribution. One person speaking is not a
conversation. It is not an exchange. Therefore, in order to meaningfully engage
with the “conversation” topic of any legal scholarship, “the scholarship of

35. Michael L. Closen & Robert M. Jarvis, The National Conference of Law Reviews Model
Code of Ethics: Final Text and Comments, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 509, 526 (1992).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 525–26 (noting that the law is a “set of building blocks that is constantly being used to
fashion new ideas”).
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others is indispensable to one’s own.”38 It is the participation in this intellectual
exchange that allows legal scholars to test and improve knowledge in a given
field “to the ultimate benefit of their students, the profession, and society”39 in
adherence with the social contract. Where a community of scholars engage in
“an endless process of discovery, reflection, and dialogue concerning ideas,
facts, and values carried on in an atmosphere of mutual support and
understanding,” the “best and most important scholarship emerges.”40
In addition to reflection and dialogue with other scholars, impactful legal
scholarship gives homage to relevant historical foundations that provide greater
understanding for the reader, or a basis for either descriptive or novel ideas. As
Professor Lefkowitz noted:
Life has come to mean so much to the scholar that he cannot
treat it so cavalierly. He has reverence for the past, for he
knows all that it has given to the present. He does not think
that the world began but yesterday, that the contribution of art
and science date but from the day before yesterday. He knows
that each age gave marvelous contributions . . . . He is
reverent of the past, of the wonderful truths that it has
uncovered. But knowing all this, he is yet confident of the
future; that much yet remains, that the miracles of the universe
are still waiting for revelation, that a high road leads from today to tomorrow and that it always goes upward.41
These comments underscore the importance of historical perspectives or the
understanding of historical foundations. Some scholars have disagreed with the
usefulness on the premise that legal scholarship’s normative nature does not
require a review of history because the relationship between present and past
neither “generate[s] or even influence[s] conventional legal scholarship.”42
Although history might not be critically instructive or necessary in all forms of
legal scholarship, where scholarship is seeking to institute change in our laws
or legal systems, reviewing relevant occurrences of the past that led to changes
is instructive and inescapably a necessity. Critical analysis through exploration
of similarities and differences in historical management of laws, arguments,

38. AALS STATEMENT, supra note 10, § II.
39. Id.
40. Cramton, supra note 23, at 2–3 (citing excerpts from a talk the author gave, noting that “[t]his
talk to a Cornell Law School alumni gathering drew freely on an excellent paper by Michael J. Graetz
& Charles H. Whitebread II, Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a University Law School, 67 VA. L. REV.
445 (1981),” id. at 2 n.5).
41. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 503–04.
42. Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 37, 40 (1998).
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motives, and outcomes is essential. Thoroughness becomes particularly crucial
when producing scholarship that can be useful in the law and other disciplines.43
V. CONCLUSION/SUGGESTIONS
Legal scholarship is a complex process of linguistic exercise. It is “mental
training” that requires the ability and “the willingness to think, to think things
through.”44 “Outstanding scholarship typically involves high risk work that is
based on substantial research, long-term training, a wealth of previous
experience, and the use of unconventional methods.”45 The legal profession
and society in general “needs the open mind and the constant care and attention
of the pedagogical expert.”46 The pedagogical experts (i.e., legal scholars)
should therefore take responsibility professionally and personally for their
work. It is therefore important that scholars adhere to some ethical norms to
ensure compliance with the social contract and promote values that are essential
to the legal profession, such as trust, accountability, mutual respect, and
fairness. Without these values, ethical lapses in legal scholarship can harm the
author,47 the credibility of academic institutions48 and the legal profession, and
violate the social contract. To preserve the relationship between the profession
and the public, the adherence to the social contract is crucial.
In order to uphold their obligations under the social contract, legal scholars
should endeavor to create scholarship that has independent value yet is still
connected to a larger conceptual body of work with appropriate

43. Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1221–22 (1981)
(noting that legal scholars need substantial amounts of time to develop an understanding of social
theory that might usefully be employed in extra-doctrinal legal scholarship).
44. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 503.
45. Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation Of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 229 (1988).
46. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 505. “[A]bove all . . . the scholar is . . . the influence of urbanity
in life and in the community. He must breathe the spirit of toleration, of the open mind, into the city
of his residence; he must suggest breadth of view among his people.” Id. at 506.
47. Ethical lapses in published writings can negatively impact an author’s reputation. In
addition, discovery of such lapses can directly affect academic career growth if included in
deliberations regarding issues of promotion or tenure of the author. Academic career growth is a very
complex process. The breadth and width of the reach of legal scholarship is oftentimes immeasurable.
Exposure of scholarship riddled with ethical concerns will have far-reaching and long-lasting harmful
effects for the author.
48. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 14, at 80 (“[C]onduct and behavior within the institution
reflects not only on [law professors] as individuals, but more importantly on the status and perception
of the institution itself”).
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acknowledgement of cited material.49 Fragments that contribute to a greater
collective body will provide insight and encourage dialogue that enriches the
legal community and society at large. Valuable scholarship will develop and
present arguments or thoughts with an aim to improve the legal profession.
This can only be accomplished coupling a foundation of truth with exhaustive
research and analysis. Whether that is done through constructive criticism or
by provoking thought, the goal should always be to improve the legal profession
and satisfy responsibilities under the social contract.
As the AALS Statement of Good Practices states:
The fact that a law professor’s income does not depend on
serving the interests of private clients permits a law professor
to take positions on issues about which practicing lawyers may
be more inhibited. With that freedom from economic pressure
goes an enhanced obligation to pursue individual and social
justice.50
Legal scholars must use the privilege of academic freedom to produce unbiased
and comprehensive scholarship that influences and instructs the law and legal
systems.
Bertolt Brecht once wrote that
[n]owadays, anyone who wishes to combat lies and ignorance
and to write the truth must overcome at least five difficulties.
He must have the courage to write the truth when truth is
everywhere opposed; the keenness to recognize it, although it
is everywhere concealed; the skill to manipulate it as a weapon;
the judgment to select those in whose hands it will be effective;
and the cunning to spread the truth among such persons.51
The social contract demands no less from legal scholars.

49. Thoroughness is essential to avoid plagiarism issues. Professor Deborah Rhode has noted
that unintentional plagiarism can result from “sloppy research.” See Deborah L. Rhode, The
Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70, 72 (2006).
50. AALS STATEMENT, supra note 10, § V.
51. BERTOLT BRECHT, WRITING THE TRUTH: FIVE DIFFICULTIES 1 (1935),
http://ada.evergreen.edu/~arunc/texts/theater/brecht/fiveDifficulties.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LYZ9NBDT].

